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INTRODUCTION
Due to the rise of globalization and the expansion of trading
frontiers, international commercial transactions have significantly
increased in both number and complexity.1 Not surprisingly, this
resulted in an increasing number of disputes.2 Although national
courts are the traditional venues for dispute resolution, parties are
more frequently turning to arbitration as a favorable alternative.3 In
1. See KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-2
(2003) (explaining that technological innovations and free trade agreements led to
an increase in the number of cross-border transactions, making business strategies
and practices increasingly complex).
2. See William Wang, Note, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform
Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1059, 1059 (2003) (noting that
increased international trade fostered disputes between states, businesses, and
individuals); see also JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2003) (identifying differing commercial and legal
traditions, cultural norms, geography, and politics as sources of disputes in
international transactions).
3. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 773, 778 (2002) (noting the emerging primacy of international
commercial arbitration as the mechanism for resolving contractual disputes);
Michael Pryles, The Growth of International Arbitration, AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT http://www.ag.gov.au/www/
rwpattach.nsf/viewasattachmentPersonal/0417185A03AF31B7CA256C8A000251
87/$file/GrowthINtArb.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (analyzing available
arbitration statistics from different Asian and Pacific regions and identifying an
upward trend in the use of arbitration); Tatyana V. Slipachuk & Per Runeland,
Kiev: From Zero to 800 Cases Per Year in Less than 10 Years, 11 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 585, 586 (2000) (charting the consistent increase in arbitration cases
submitted to the International Commercial Arbitration Court from 1993-1999);
Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Analysis of UNCITRAL Questionnaires
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the context of contractual business disputes, international
commercial arbitration provides a number of benefits not available
through litigation.4 However, arbitration is not free from downsides,5
such as difficulties related to the arbitral tribunals’ willingness and
ability to order and enforce interim measures of protection during
international commercial arbitration proceedings.6
Notwithstanding the increasingly frequent use of interim
measures, there is little consensus about the scope of the arbitral
tribunal’s powers and how interim actions are enforced.7 In an effort
to encourage uniformity, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) amended its provision on

on Interim Relief, 16-3 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 11 (2001) (remarking on the
distinctions among the use of arbitration in the fields of labor, securities, business
disputes, and consumer transactions).
4. See PIETER SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION?: SIXTY YEARS OF
ARBITRATION PRACTICE 7-8 (1999) (identifying the parties’ ability to choose the
composition of the arbitral tribunal, language of the proceeding, and rules
governing the arbitration as special advantages to international arbitration);
Stephen M. Ferguson, Interim Measures of Protection in International
Commercial Arbitration: Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Anticipated Results,
12 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 55, 55 (2003) (confirming simplicity, lower costs,
confidentiality, and speed of resolution as reasons for favoring arbitration over
civil litigation); Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection; Security
for Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (in
Toto): Article 46, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155, 156-57 (1998) (adding the
availability of expert arbitrators, the ability to choose in advance the governing
substantive law, and the avoidance of unpredictable jury trials as advantages to
arbitration).
5. See SANDERS, supra note 4, at 7 (considering the possibility of a final
arbitral award being set aside as a main drawback to arbitration because of the cost
and delay involved with post-arbitration court proceedings and the possibility of
having to initiate new arbitration proceedings to resolve the dispute).
6. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 55 (identifying issues of enforceability, the
inability of parties to request interim measures prior to the formation of the arbitral
tribunal, and the reluctance of the tribunal to order interim measures as drawbacks
arising in international commercial arbitration).
7. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001](finding significant differences among national
arbitration laws on the issuance of interim measures by arbitral tribunals); see, e.g.,
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 347 (4th ed. 2004) (exemplifying the disagreement by
contrasting an arbitral tribunal ruling under the ICC Rules and a domestic court
ruling under the Ethiopian Civil Code).
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interim measures in 2006.8 The revisions to the UNCITRAL Model
Law (“Model Law”) elaborated on the powers of the arbitral tribunal
to grant interim measures, defining scope of interim measures and
the courts’ role of support and enforcement.9
Despite UNCITRAL’s efforts to foster uniformity and
harmonization through a model legislative provision and the
predicted success of the changes,10 the majority of states have yet to
adopt the amendments to Article 17.11 This Comment argues that
states should adopt the 2006 amendments to Article 17 because the
absence of harmonized legislation undermines the validity of
international commercial arbitration proceedings.
Part I discusses interim measures in the context of international
commercial arbitration and explains the 2006 amendments to the
Model Law. Part II analyzes the Model Law amendment’s
contributions to international commercial arbitration practice and
presents reasons for states to incorporate the Model Law
amendments. Part III recommends how states and arbitral institutions
should respond to the Model Law amendment and how UNCITRAL
may be able to improve on the current version of Article 17.

8. See G.A. Res. 61/33, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006)
(recognizing the need for revisions to the Model Law in light of current practices
on interim measures in arbitration, and adopting the amendments proposed by the
Working Group).
9. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model
Law on Commercial Arbitration, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.V.4 (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Model Law] (incorporating the
amendments in Article 17 of the new “Chapter IV A” relating to interim measures
and preliminary orders).
10. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 55, 64-65 (predicting that the revisions to
Article 17 will be widely accepted and will have a significant impact on national
legislation and institutional arbitration rules).
11. See UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, Note by the
Secretariat, ¶ 5, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/674 (May
14, 2009) [hereinafter Status of Model Law] (indicating that only four states have
enacted legislation based on the 2006 Model Law provisions on interim measures,
significantly lower than the number of states that incorporated the previous 1985
version of Article 17).
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I. BACKGROUND
It is not difficult to understand why parties seeking to settle
contractual disputes rely on international commercial arbitration.12
Arbitration proceedings can be highly favorable compared to the
rigidity and complexity of litigating in national courts.13 International
commercial arbitration gives parties the freedom to choose the
arbitrators who will decide their dispute and a confidential forum
based on the laws and criteria the parties chose.14 Such features are
particularly important when parties wish to avoid the publicity
accompanying litigation and to preserve business relationships.15

A. INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION DEFINED
At the most fundamental level, interim measures of protection are
forms of temporary relief16 intended to safeguard the rights of the
parties until the arbitral tribunal issues a final award.17 Interim
12. See SANDERS, supra note 4, at 2-6 (discussing arbitration’s advantages of
expediency, confidentiality, and cost efficiency).
13. See id. at 3 (noting that arbitral proceedings are streamlined as compared to
national court proceedings, and that arbitral appeals are the exception, rather than
the rule); see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7,
at 3-4 (contending that although arbitration is an alternative to litigation in national
courts, it still requires the support of national arbitration legislation and national
courts to function effectively).
14. See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-3 (2008) (outlining consensual
agreements, non-governmental decision-makers, and final and binding awards as
defining characteristics of international commercial arbitration).
15. See OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8 (1994) (recognizing that arbitration’s privacy is
particularly well suited for disputes involving sensitive information like trade
secrets or defective products).
16. See John Charles Thomas, Selected Issues: Interim Measures in
International Arbitration: Finding the Best Answer, 12 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 213,
213-14 (2005) (distinguishing interim measures, which are temporary actions by
the tribunal subject to the final award, from partial or interlocutory awards).
17. See UNCITRAL, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, Report of the Secretariat, 42, delivered to
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25, 1985) (enunciating that
interim measures are meant to “prevent or minimize any disadvantage”); HOWARD
M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
COMMENTARY 542 (1989) (excerpting the Seventh Secretariat Note on the power
of an arbitral tribunal to order interim measures to protect parties’ rights until the
final award is rendered); ALI YESILIRMAK, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN

BUCY_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

584

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 5:28 PM

[25:579

measures of protection arise in a variety of circumstances in
international arbitration and their uses vary depending on the context
and forum.18 Still, they are a procedural necessity in both public and
private means of dispute resolution.19 In many cases, interim
measures determine the efficacy of the arbitral award.20 Interim relief
can have “final and significant consequences”21 without which an
adverse party may easily render an award meaningless.22
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 4 (2005) (insisting the underlying
principle of interim measures is that no party’s rights should be negatively affected
as a result of the duration of the proceedings).
18. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
1943-2019 (2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2009]
(surveying the use of interim measures in international arbitration proceedings and
explaining the relevant authorities that authorize and govern their use); Ali
Yesilirmak, Interim and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitral Practice, 11 ICC
INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 31, 31 (Spring 2000) (discussing the importance of
interim measures in protecting party rights during ICC arbitrations); Julian D. M.
Lew, Commentary on Interim and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitration
Cases, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 23, 26-30 (Spring 2000) (illustrating
through an analysis of ICC awards how arbitral tribunals use interim measures in
international commercial arbitration practice); see also Douglas D. Reichert,
Provisional Remedies in the Context of International Commercial Arbitration, 3
INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 368, 370-74 (1986) (distinguishing between interim
measures issued by arbitral tribunals and provisional remedies available through
the courts to support arbitration proceedings).
19. See, e.g., Alan Redfern, Interim Measures, in THE LEADING ARBITRATOR’S
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 203, 209 (Lawrence W. Newman &
Richard D. Hill ed., 2008) [hereinafter LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE] (noting the
increased importance of interim measures in disputes involving international
transactions due to the relative ease with which evidence and assets can be moved
across borders); LAWRENCE COLLINS, Provisional and Protective Measures in
International Litigation, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1, 10 (1994) (assessing the interim protection of rights as an
established general principle of law in all legal systems).
20. See Bernardo M. Cremades, The Need for Conservatory and Preliminary
Measures, 27 INT’L BUS. LAW. 226, 226-27 (1999) (bemoaning that recalcitrant
parties, if left unchecked, can render a final award meaningless and unenforceable
through bad faith and obstruction).
21. UNCITRAL, Possible Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning
Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection,
Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 66,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (Jan. 14,
2000) [hereinafter Possible Uniform Rules] (contending that such consequences
may not be reversible even if the interim order is later modified).
22. See UNCITRAL, Working Group on Arbitration, Possible Future Work:
Court-Ordered Interim Measures of Protection in Support of Arbitration, Scope of
Interim Measures that May be Issued by Arbitral Tribunals, Validity of the
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Generally, there is little consensus as to the scope, function, and
proper use of interim measures in arbitration.23 However, certain
characteristics are common.24 A party to the arbitration must make a
request25 for a temporary or provisional protective measure under
conditions demonstrating urgency26 and a risk of serious or
irreparable harm.27 Additionally, interim measures are binding only
on the parties to the arbitration28 and the issuing body may review
and modify the order.29
Agreement to Arbitrate, Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 7, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WF.111 (Oct. 12, 2000) [hereinafter
Interim Measures] (decrying the ease with which parties can remove assets from a
jurisdiction to avoid an arbitral award).
23. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 340-50 (noting the disparity
amongst national and institutional rules regarding the use of interim measures).
Even the names used for identifying interim measures differ by forum. See, e.g.,
2006 Model Law, supra note 9, arts. 9, 17 (“interim measures”); Bunesgesetz über
das Internationale Privatrecht [Federal Code on Private International Law] Dec. 18,
1987, SR 291, art. 183 (Switz.), translated in SWISS CPIL, (Umbricht Attorneys,
2007) available at http://www.umbricht.com/pdf/SwissPIL.pdf (“provisional or
protective measures”); London Court of International Arbitration [LCIA],
Arbitration Rules, Art. 25 (“interim and conservatory measures”); Int’l Chamber of
Commerce [ICC], Rules of Arbitration, at 23(2) (Jan. 1, 2008) (“interim or
conservatory measures”); International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes [ICSID], Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and
Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 39 (Oct. 14, 1966) (“provisional measures”).
24. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 5-7 (2005) (delineating nine essential
characteristics of interim measures in arbitration that are not subject to variation
from one country to another, including that interim relief “should not exceed the
final relief. . .” and “should normally be granted where it is risky to await the final
relief”).
25. See, e.g., 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 17 (providing for interim
measures only at the request of a party).
26. See Partial Award in Case 8113, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 65, 6768 (Spring 2000) [hereinafter Case 8113] (reiterating that urgency is the basic
requirement for granting provisional relief); Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, Case No.
498, Award No. ITM 64-498-1 (Dec. 4, 1986), reprinted in 13 IRAN-US CTR 193,
196-98 (denying a request for the stay of court proceedings because the request
demonstrated no urgency as it was made six years after the commencement of the
proceedings).
27. See, e.g., Case of 8113, supra note 26, at 65-69 (refusing to grant interim
measures when the damages awarded would fully compensate for loss incurred);
Markus Wirth, Interim or Preventive Measures in Support of International
Arbitration in Switzerland, 18 ASA BULL. 31, 36-37 (2000) (defining the level of
detriment as that which cannot “easily be remedied (exposure to ‘irreparable’
harm)”).
28. See Houston Putnam Lowry, Recent Developments in International
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Interim measures generally fall into two broad categories:30 1)
measures aimed at avoiding or minimizing loss, damage, or
prejudice;31 and 2) measures facilitating the enforcement of arbitral
awards.32 Measures meant to avoid loss, damage, or prejudice usually
serve the purpose of preserving the state of affairs pending the final
resolution of the dispute.33 They are functionally similar to court
injunctions in that they may require a party to continue performance
or abstain from taking certain actions that may frustrate the
resolution of the dispute.34 Common examples of such measures
include orders for the preservation of evidence related to the subject
matter of the dispute, orders for the sale of perishable goods to
Commercial Arbitration, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335, 340 (2004)
(recognizing that it is hornbook law that arbitrators’ decisions are not binding on
third parties); see also UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration
on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, ¶ 64, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Report of the Thirty-Second
Session] (highlighting that although arbitral tribunals cannot bind third parties,
they can still significantly affect parties outside the arbitration who may, for
example, possess assets of a party).
29. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 64
(characterizing the ability to review or modify interim measures based on situation
specific circumstances or case progress as a salient procedure to be included in any
uniform provision). The ability to review or modify awards is also present in many
sets of arbitration rules. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes [ICSID] Arbitration Rules, Rule 39 (stipulating that the tribunal may
modify or revoke awards only after giving the parties the opportunity to present
their observations); Singapore International Arbitration Centre [SIAC] Arbitration
Rules, Rule 26.1 (1997) (allowing for confirmation or amendment of a provisional
order by any arbitrator possessing jurisdiction); Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts &
Docs., art. 76(1) (condoning modification if justified by a change in the situation).
30. See UNCITRAL, Working Group II, Settlement of Commercial Disputes,
Preparation of Uniform Provisions on Interim Measures of Protection, Note by the
Secretariat, ¶ 16, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.119 (Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Settlement of Commercial
Disputes] (noting that distinctions between specific types of interim measures are
not always clear and that interim measures can fall into more than one category).
31. See id. ¶ 17 (encompassing measures that maintain the respective positions
of the parties until the final award).
32. See id. ¶ 18 (including measures concerning assets, property, and security
for costs that ensure that there will be sufficient available resources to satisfy the
arbitral award).
33. See id. ¶¶ 16-17 (explaining that such measures ensure that the parties do
not cause unnecessary harm through their actions, or inactions, during the
arbitration proceedings).
34. See LEW ET AL., supra note 2, at 596-97 (discussing measures that regulate
and stabilize party relations during arbitral proceedings).
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minimize damages, and orders ensuring confidentiality of
information disclosed during the proceedings.35
Equally important are those measures aimed at facilitating later
enforcement of the arbitral award.36 Interim measures ensure that
actions taken by an adverse party during the arbitration proceedings
to avoid enforcement do not render the arbitral tribunal’s final award
meaningless.37 These measures include ordering parties to provide
security for costs,38 attaching or freezing assets to prevent removal
from the jurisdiction,39 or depositing the assets that would be used to
satisfy the award with a third party pending the resolution of the
dispute.40

35. See Settlement of Commercial Disputes, supra note 30, ¶ 17 (including also
the appointment of administrators to manage income-producing assets during the
proceedings, orders for inspections at an early stage of the proceedings when there
is the strong possibility the situation may change, and orders preventing the loss of
a party’s right).
36. See id. ¶ 18 (providing that parties may request orders to freeze assets and
post security for the amount in dispute and the cost of arbitration).
37. See Lawrence F. Ebb, Flight of Assets from the Jurisdiction “In the
Twinkling of a Telex”: Pre- and Post- Award Conservatory Relief in International
Commercial Arbitrations, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 9, 9-10 (1990) (lamenting the ease and
frequency with which losing parties can remove mobile assets from the jurisdiction
to avoid enforcement of the arbitral award).
38. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1387 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004)
(defining “security for costs” as “[m]oney, property, or a bond given to a court by
a plaintiff or appellant to secure the payment of court costs if the party loses”);
YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 214-15 (applying the traditional definition of
security for costs to arbitration and recognizing that under a number of arbitration
rules, arbitrators can require a party to provide security for costs, which can
include the costs of the arbitration proceedings, but also acknowledging that such
orders are highly debated); Interim Award in Case 8786 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB.
81, 82-83 (Spring 2000) (citing cases granting security for payment).
39. See Kevin J. Brody, Note, An Argument for Pre-Award Attachment in
International Arbitration Under the New York Convention, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
99, 100 (1985) (finding pre-award attachment or garnishment useful in coercing
adverse party cooperation); Joseph D. Becker, Attachments in Aid of International
Arbitration—the American Position, 1 ARB. INT’L 40, 40-41 (1985) (explaining
attachments are used for the purpose of security in arbitration proceedings).
40. See, e.g., Nederlands Arbitrage Instituut [NAI], Interim Award in Case No.
1694, American Producer v. German Constr. Co., XIII YBCA 97 (Dec. 12, 1996)
(ordering a party to provide a $6.5 million bank guarantee).
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B. POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO ISSUE INTERIM MEASURES OF
PROTECTION
Historically, states viewed the power to issue interim measures as
belonging solely to the national courts,41 which was rooted in public
policy concerns.42 However, over time, states began to recognize the
effectiveness and reliability of arbitration in resolving disputes.43 To
acknowledge the increasing use of arbitration and the necessity for
protections of party rights comparable to those provided by national
courts, states amended national arbitration laws to allow arbitrators
some power to order interim relief.44 States began to view the courts’
role as supportive of arbitration, rather than considering them
separately. As a result, states modernized their national arbitration
laws to either expressly allow for the issuance of interim orders by
arbitral tribunals or to allow parties to agree to confer such power.45
41. See LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 19, at 209 (observing that
states were initially reluctant to grant arbitral tribunals the power to issue interim
measures); see, e.g., C. Proc. Civ. Y Com. 766, Art. 753 [Argentine National Code
of Civil and Commercial Procedure] (“Arbitrators cannot order compulsory
measures or measures leading to enforcement.”); Italian Code of Civil Procedure,
Title VII, Art. 818 (1997), available at www.camera-arbitrale.com (“The
arbitrators may not grant attachments or other interim measures of protection.”);
P.R.C.: Arbitration Law, art. 68, translated in 34 I.L.M. 1650 (1995) [hereinafter
China Arbitration Law] (asserting that any request for interim relief must be
referred to the courts).
42. See Lew, supra note 18, at 24 (supporting the delegation of power to issue
interim measures solely to the national courts in response to the difficulties
national courts faced in enforcing an arbitral tribunal’s orders for interim measures
and a tribunal’s lack of coercive powers to enforce their own orders).
43. See, e.g., Neil E. McDonell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in
International Commercial Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 273, 275-77
(1984) (comparing the development of several national laws regarding the
availability of provisional relief in arbitration proceedings).
44. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 715-16 (1999)
(elaborating on the modernization of national laws to allow for concurrent powers
regarding conservatory measures in arbitration proceedings).
45. E.g., Houdende het gerechtelijk wetboek [Belgian Judicial Code], art.
1696., available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm//belgiu m.code.judicature.1998/sisu
_manifest.html (permitting the tribunal to issue interim relief at the request of a
party with the exception of attachment orders); Arbitration Act, 1996 c. 23, § 39
(Eng.), available at www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/ukpg a_19960023_en_3#pt1pb7-L1g39 (permitting the parties to agree to give the tribunal the power to issue
interim relief); Arbitration Act, 1986, art. 1051 (Neth.) (permitting an agreement
allowing the tribunal to issue an award in a summary proceeding, within certain
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C. UNCITRAL’S 2006 AMENDMENT TO MODEL LAW
ARTICLE 17
The UNCITRAL Model Law, originally adopted in 1985,46 is a
cornerstone of international commercial arbitration practice.47 By
2005, at least forty-three states specifically incorporated Model Law
provisions on interim measures into their national arbitration laws.48
However, as of 2004, over half of these incorporated more detail into
their national legislation than was provided in the Model Law.49
In an effort to modernize the Model Law to conform to the actual
practices of international commercial arbitration, the UNCITRAL
Secretariat identified thirteen potential topics for future work by the
Commission and recognized the use and enforceability of interim
measures as a priority.50 UNCITRAL assigned this project to
Working Group II, which conducted deliberations for review and
revision, and subsequently produced draft provisions for amending
the Model Law.51
In explaining the need for UNCITRAL’s attention to interim
measures, the Secretary General said:
[P]arties are seeking interim measures in an increasing
number of cases. This trend and lack of clear guidance to
arbitral tribunals as to the scope of interim measures that may
limits).
46. G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985).
47. See Eric E. Bergsten, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration From International to National Legislation: Implementation of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration into National
Legislation, 10 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 101, 101 (2003) (declaring the Model Law to
be “an extraordinarily successful example of international preparation of a legal
text”).
48. PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 394-95 (2d. ed. 2005).
49. Id. (providing a comparison chart with forty-six countries as to the
amendmendments these countries have made to their arbitration laws).
50. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 286, ¶ 9 (including the
enforcement of interim measures as one of four priority items for the creation of
uniform provisions).
51. See generally UNCITRAL, Working Group II, 2000 to Present:
International Arbitration and Conciliation, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010)
(providing the session reports of the Working Group on Arbitration detailing its
deliberations and progress).
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be issued and the conditions for their issuance may hinder the
effective and efficient functioning of international
commercial arbitration. . . . [T]his may lead to undesirable
consequences . . . [and] may also prompt parties to seek
interim measures from courts instead of the arbitral tribunals
in situations where the arbitral tribunal would be well placed
to issue an interim measure; this causes unnecessary cost and
delay . . . .52
The purpose of revising Article 17 was to clarify three important
elements regarding the use of interim measures: 1) the scope of the
arbitral tribunal’s power to order interim relief; 2) the enforcement of
tribunal ordered interim measures; and 3) the role of the courts in
supporting arbitration; all of which were left open-ended and
undeveloped by the previous provision.53 Before the 2006
amendment, Article 17 read:
Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
may, at the request of a party, order any party to take such
interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may
consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the
dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide
appropriate security in connection with such measure.54
Based in part on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,55 this provision
provides little, if any, guidance as to the scope and substance of the
arbitral tribunal’s power to issue interim measures.56
Additionally, Model Law Article 9 provides that requests to a
national court for interim measures are not incompatible with the
decision to arbitrate.57 Under Article 9, courts may hear requests for
52. Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶ 104.
53. See id. ¶ 103 (discussing the necessity for clarification in light of the many
broad formulations of arbitrator powers found in national arbitration laws).
54. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration, U.N.
Doc. A/40/17,/Annex (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 Model Law].
55. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26(1) (“[T]he arbitral tribunal may
take any interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of
the dispute.”).
56. See BINDER, supra note 48, at 152 (recognizing the “consider necessary”
clause as the only limit to the arbitral tribunal’s discretion).
57. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 9 (ensuring that a request for
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interim measures by parties in arbitration, but the Article lacks clear
guidance on the courts’ role in ordering such measures once arbitral
proceedings are initiated.58 Both Articles 9 and 17 fail to address the
scope and procedural issues involved with concurrent jurisdiction.59
By amending Article 17, UNCITRAL sought to provide clarity
and guidance. After nearly six years, Article 17 grew from a single
paragraph provision to a detailed outline of the procedures for
interim measures.60 The goal of the amended Model Law was to
acknowledge and harmonize existing legislation and practices in the
field as opposed to creating new rules or standards for the arbitration
process.61 The amended version of Article 17 is intended to address
the concerns, confusion, and criticisms surrounding the previous text
by outlining in detail the procedural aspects of the use of interim
measures that the provision lacked.62

II. ANALYSIS
UNCITRAL’s recognition of the inadequacies of the previous
Model Law on interim measures of protection led to the development

interim relief to the courts does not constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate).
58. See id. (providing that a request to the court does not violate the arbitration
agreement, but positing no further explanation of how the courts should respond).
59. See Christopher Huntley, The Scope of Article 17: Interim Measures Under
the UNCITRAL Model Law, 9 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 69, 69, 74-75
(noting that the lack of a comprehensive description of the boundaries of Model
Law provisions related to interim relief forces tribunals to define the scope of their
mandate to award interim measures on a case by case basis).
60. Compare 1985 Model Law, supra note 54, art. 17 (granting arbitrators a
general power to order interim relief related to the subject matter of the dispute),
with 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 17 (including provisions on the power of
arbitral tribunals to issue interim measures, conditions for granting interim
measures, procedures regarding preliminary orders, recognition and enforcement
of interim measures, and the role of court-ordered interim measures).
61. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 60 (discussing the objectives of the Model
Law as harmonization, minimization of court intervention, respect for parties’
freedom of choice, providing court assistance in support of proceedings and
enforceability of awards, and ensuring fairness and due process in arbitration
proceedings through mandatory provisions to be followed by arbitrators, courts,
and parties to the dispute).
62. See Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 6-29 (describing the difficulties
arising from the previous text and prescribing as the remedy provisions on
categories of interim measures available, guidelines on court enforcement, and the
availability of court-ordered interim relief).
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of what promised to be an essential text in arbitration.63 But despite
predictions of widespread acceptance, the majority of states have not
integrated the new version of Article 17.64 This, however, should not
detract from the important purposes the amendment will serve.65
There are a number of compelling reasons why states should
incorporate the amendments to Article 17.66 In particular, states
should consider that the efficacy of arbitration proceedings depends
on the use and enforcement of interim measures. Furthermore,
arbitration is a practical and efficient forum for ordering interim
relief, and adoption of the Model Law amendment will harmonize
national arbitration laws. This will inspire the confidence necessary
for the survival of international commercial arbitration as a
prominent dispute resolution mechanism.

A. STATES’ FAILURE TO USE AND ENFORCE INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION UNDERMINE THE EFFICACY OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS
In preliminary discussions on possible Model Law amendments,
UNCITRAL noted that interim measures of protection are critical to
the facilitation of dispute resolution in every legal system.67 Interim
relief, or the lack thereof, can have a substantial or even
determinative effect on the outcome of any case, whether submitted
to litigation or arbitration.68 When parties litigate disputes, national
63. See Huntley, supra note 59, at 69 (calling the Model Law “one of the most
important bodies of law in the world of international commercial arbitration”).
64. See Status of Model Law, supra note 11, ¶ 5 (indicating that of the nearly
seventy jurisdictions operating under the Model Law, only Mauritius, New
Zealand, Peru, and Slovenia have adopted legislation based on the 2006
amendments).
65. See Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 10-11 (noting that, currently,
while some countries have adopted adequate legislative regimes to address
enforcement issues, these countries are still unable to enforce protective measures
against parties in countries that lack adequate regulation).
66. See e.g. Ferguson, supra note 4, at 65 (noting a reduction in the caseloads
of national courts as one expected impact of the revised articles on interim
measures).
67. See Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶ 6 (expressing interim relief’s
importance in the context of protecting party rights and effectively resolving
disputes).
68. See Raymond J. Werbicki, Arbitral Interim Measures: Fact or Fiction?, 57
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courts have established procedures for determining when and to what
extent they will grant interim relief.69 Unfortunately, this is not the
case in international commercial arbitration.
Still, interim measures of protection in arbitration proceedings are
just as important as in litigation proceedings.70 They ensure that
disputes are resolved in a fair and effective manner, with the primary
purpose of protecting parties’ rights during the proceedings.71 In
discussing improvements to the Model Law provisions on interim
measures, UNCITRAL noted the importance of ensuring “that
parties choosing to resolve their disputes through arbitration do not
forfeit any rights to avail themselves of any interim relief measure
that they would have had in litigation.”72 Interim measures compel
parties in arbitration to behave in a manner that allows for effective
and efficient proceedings and ensures that the subsequent final award
is not rendered meaningless.73 Ultimately, interim measures are
necessary because no party should sustain additional damages during
the arbitration proceedings.74
As parties rely more on arbitration to resolve their disputes, it
follows that there will also be an increase in requests for interim

DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 63 (2003) (emphasizing that the lack of interim relief
compromises a party’s ability to preserve necessary evidence and increases the risk
that a prevailing party may not be able to recover the final award).
69. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, at 920
(explaining that the range of provisional measures provided by national courts are
generally the same among all developed legal systems).
70. See id. (adding that interim measures are, nonetheless, difficult to obtain in
the international arbitration setting).
71. See Carbonneau, supra note 3, at 773-74 (suggesting such measures are
especially necessary to accomplish these goals given the unique difficulties posed
by cross-border transactions, including the diversity of regimes and the pursuit of
nationalistic self-interest).
72. Settlement of Commercial Disputes, supra note 30, ¶ 15. But see Card v.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 806, 813-14 (D. Minn. 1996) (internal
citation omitted) (characterizing arbitration as a “creature born of a contract,“
meaning that parties cannot expect to receive all of the procedural and substantive
protections available in the courts, but rather only those protections to which they
have agreed).
73. Ferguson, supra note 4, at 55.
74. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 5 (implying that parties’ decision to
arbitrate should not subject them to damages while awaiting the final award that
would otherwise have not been incurred in litigation).
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relief from arbitral tribunals.75 This elevates the importance of
incorporating procedures for interim measures into governing
arbitration law.76 Furthermore, it is a rational assumption that parties
intend for arbitration proceedings to resolve the entire dispute.77 If
parties are unable to obtain comparable interim relief in the arbitral
context and are instead forced to rely on courts to secure such relief,
parties will be dissuaded from submitting their disputes to
arbitration.78
The actual use of interim measures further demonstrates the
necessity of incorporating them into governing arbitration laws.79 A
wide range of arbitration laws and rules empower arbitrators, albeit
vaguely, to issue interim relief.80 When an arbitral tribunal fails to
75. See Wang, supra note 2, at 1059-60 (viewing the rapid expansion in the use
of arbitration as contributing to the importance of interim measures in arbitration
proceedings and the need for a solid framework for their use). Although some
argue that the number of requests for interim relief in arbitration proceedings is
insufficient to support amending rules and legislation in order to empower arbitral
tribunals to order interim measures, this critique ignores a key point: parties may
not request interim relief from arbitration tribunals in the first place given the
“widely felt uncertainty” as to the availability of such relief. LEW ET AL., supra
note 2, at 589 n.13.
76. See David E. Wagoner, Interim Relief in International Arbitration:
Enforcement is a Substantial Problem, 51 DIS. RESOL. J. 68, 69 (1996) (asserting
the compelling need for the availability of interim relief in international arbitration
to protect party rights pending a final decision by the arbitral tribunal).
77. See D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of
Protection – Is the Tide About to Turn?, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 71, 72-73 (1995)
[hereinafter Arbitration and the Courts] (positing that parties who employ an
arbitration clause can reasonably be expected to resolve any disputes by the agreed
upon method of dispute resolution, though also noting that in some instances
parties prefer the greater power of the courts).
78. Cf. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, at 718-19 (reiterating that
jurisdiction over the dispute is determined in almost all cases by the agreement of
the parties, except that parties cannot, by agreement, augment the powers of the
arbitrator to grant certain types of relief that remain within the exclusive power of
courts).
79. See generally LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 19, 203-21
(classifying interim measures into four broad categories: those intended to
facilitate the arbitral proceeding, those intended to preserve the status quo, those
intended to assist enforcement of future awards, and those intended to afford
security for the costs of arbitration).
80. See Settlement of Commercial Disputes, supra note 30, ¶¶ 11, 13-33
(consolidating the results of a UNCITRAL survey on the practices of nations
regarding their procedures for interim relief in arbitration and finding, inter alia,
that several rules recognize the concurrent power of courts and arbitral tribunals to
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order interim relief, either because existing legislation fails to grant
this power to the tribunal81 or because the tribunal chooses not to
exercise its power,82 the adverse party may remove assets from a
jurisdiction, destroy evidence, or otherwise frustrate the
proceedings.83 Such actions can cause irreparable harm to the
requesting party84 and this failure to protect parties undermines the
favorability of the arbitration process.85
UNCITRAL amended Article 17 to account for each of the above
considerations. Article 17 recognizes the importance of interim
measures and the need for arbitration procedures to meet the
practical needs of the parties.86 It also acknowledges that in order for
these measures to be effective, there must be structure and standards
for the use of interim measures.87 The amended Model Law explicitly
provides that arbitral tribunals have the power to issue interim
issue interim relief). See also Werbicki, supra note 68, at 64 (clarifying that even
though arbitrators may have broad discretion to grant interim measures, their
power is actually limited by a number of factors, including the difficulty of
enforcement, the inability to respond to urgent requests for interim measures, and
the effect of the governing law of arbitration in the jurisdiction).
81. See, e.g., C. Proc. Civ. Y Com. 766, Art, 753 [Argentine National Code of
Civil and Commercial Procedure] (“Arbitrators cannot order compulsory measures
or measures leading to enforcement.”); Italian Code of Civil Procedure, Title VII,
Art. 818 (1997), available at www.camera-arbitrale.com (“The arbitrators may not
grant attachments or other interim measures of protection.”)
82. See supra Part I.B (discussing the reluctance of arbitrators to provide
interim relief because of confusion or lack of coercive powers).
83. See supra Part I.A (discussing appropriate uses for and purposes of interim
relief).
84. See Wagoner, supra note 76, at 69 (identifying environmental impact cases,
trade secret disputes, and the direct appointment of a receiver as instances in which
interim measures are required for effective management of the arbitration); Interim
Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 7-12 (identifying the issue of unenforceable final
awards as a primary concern for the Working Group).
85. Cf. Ira M. Schwartz, Interim and Emergency Relief in Arbitration
Proceedings, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57-58 (noting the pervasive, and erroneous,
belief that parties cannot obtain interim relief in arbitration).
86. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 60 (recognizing
the increased use of interim measures in arbitral proceedings and the necessity for
such measures to be available and enforceable for the continued effectiveness of
international commercial arbitration).
87. See generally Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 30-32 (stating the
Working Group’s belief that conformity with the Model Law would ameliorate the
existing disparities with regards to states’ recognition of the authority of arbitral
tribunals to grant interim measures).
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measures, details which measures are available, and explains the
conditions under which such measures can be granted.88 For
example, the amended Model Law acknowledges the inherent
necessity for interim measures in cases where the requesting party
can show that failure to issue such protective measures will likely
result in harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages.89
States can provide sound procedural and substantive guidance for
the use of interim measures by incorporating the amended Article 17
into national arbitration legislation. In doing so, states can also
recognize the importance of interim measures in arbitration, respect
participating parties’ freedom to choose arbitration, and demonstrate
support for the continued use of international commercial arbitration.

B. ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ARE A PRACTICAL AND EFFICIENT
FORUM FOR GRANTING INTERIM MEASURES
Parties more frequently request interim relief from arbitral
tribunals.90 However, arbitral tribunals have been hesitant to grant
requests because of the confusion surrounding the scope of their
powers.91 In 1985, UNCITRAL attempted to remedy these concerns
by providing in the Model Law that arbitrators were empowered to
order interim relief.92 However, this only superficially solved the
problem because the provision did not delve into the procedural or

88. 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 17.
89. See id. art. 17A(1) (“[T]he party requesting an interim measure . . . shall
satisfy the arbitral tribunal that . . . [h]arm not adequately reparable by an award of
damages is likely to result . . . and such harm substantially outweighs the harm . . .
to the party against whom the measure is directed . . . .”).
90. See Naimark & Keer, supra note 3, at 11 (studying the use of interim relief
in arbitration and finding an increase in requests for interim relief to arbitrators);
cf. Jan K. Schaefer, New Solutions for Interim Measures of Protection in
International Commercial Arbitration: English, German and Hong Kong Law
Compared, 2.2 ELEC. J. COMP. L. § 6 (1998), http://www.ejcl.org/22/art22-2.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (implying that some states have amended their
domestic arbitration laws to account for the growing use of interim relief).
91. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, at 922
(doubting that an arbitrator will issue interim relief unless satisfied that an order is
permissible under the applicable national arbitration legislation); see also Christian
Hausmaninger, Civil Liability of Arbitrators – Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 7, 7-8 (1990) (discussing the risk of civil
liability for arbitrators and arbitrators’ resultant fear of misusing their authority).
92. 1985 Model Law, supra note 54, art. 17.
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substantive issues involved in allowing arbitrators to order interim
measures.93
Still, the arbitral tribunal is well established as an appropriate
forum for granting interim relief.94 The arbitral tribunal is sometimes
referred to as the “natural judge,”95 because the arbitrator is in the
best position to assess the claim’s possibility of success on the merits
and can appropriately evaluate the impact that interim measures may
have on the parties and the arbitration proceedings.96 Arbitrators are
also better able to identify when requests for interim relief are
abusive and employed for tactical purposes.97 Additionally, allowing
arbitral tribunals to issue interim relief prevents unnecessary costs
and delays that accompany a request for interim relief to the national
courts.98 It also further promotes freedom to choose arbitration as the
means for resolving the dispute.99
However, the procedure for obtaining interim relief during
arbitrations can be complicated when national courts have concurrent
93. See Lowry, supra note 28, at 339 (noting that a variety of promulgated
rules, including UNCITRAL’s 1985 Model law, recognize the power of arbitral
tribunals to issue interim measures, but highlighting the lack of consensus about
what types of interim measures can be issued or what enforcement mechanisms are
available).
94. See Cecil Branson, Global Development: Interim Measures of Protection in
a Changing International Commercial Arbitration, 9 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 9, 11
(2002) (affirming that measures aimed at facilitating arbitral proceedings should be
within the scope of arbitrators’ powers because of the tribunal’s emphasis on party
autonomy and fairness); Biwater Gauff Ltd. V. United Republic of Tanzania,
Procedural Order No. 3, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 ¶ 135 (Sept. 29, 2007),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org (observing that it is a matter of settled law
that arbitral tribunals can order parties to take provisional measures).
95. YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 66.
96. See LEW ET AL., supra note 2, at 589 (noting that an arbitrator’s familiarity
with the legal and factual intricacies of the case make the arbitral tribunal a more
appropriate forum to determine the appropriateness of interim measures than a
domestic court).
97. Id.
98. See Michael E. Chionopoulos, Preliminary Injunction Through Arbitration:
The Franchisor’s Weapon of Choice in Trademark Disputes, 20 FRANCHISE L.J.
15, 15 (2000) (advising parties already engaged in arbitration against filing for
interim relief in court since it requires payment of additional filing fees, attorneys’
fees, and other miscellaneous costs involved with court proceedings).
99. See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International
Commercial Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 24 (1997) (recognizing respect for
party autonomy as fundamental to arbitration practice).
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jurisdiction.100 Although arbitrators may possess a degree of power
and discretion to issue interim measures, a party to an arbitration can
still apply for interim relief to a court.101 In determining whether to
grant a request for interim relief, a court must consider both the
moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits and the necessity
of interim relief.102 This inevitably involves the court in the main
issues of the dispute.103 This is not to say that national courts have no
place in procedures for granting interim relief during arbitration. In
some cases, the national courts are the only forums from which
parties can obtain interim relief.104 Rather, arbitrators should be
clearly vested with the power to order interim relief in situations
where they constitute the most appropriate forum.105 Despite
concerns that concurrent jurisdiction may allow national courts to
unnecessarily impose on arbitral disputes,106 concurrent jurisdiction
does not allow courts to rule on the substance of the dispute and
thereby intervene in matters under the arbitral tribunal’s
100. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Is Exclusion of Concurrent Courts’
Jurisdiction Over Conservatory Measures to be Introduced Through a Revision of
the Conventions?, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 105, 111 (1989) (highlighting the complex, but
sometimes complimentary, effect of concurrent jurisdiction).
101. 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 9.
102. See Alison C. Wauk, Comment, Preliminary Injunctions in Arbitrable
Disputes: The Case for Limited Court Jurisdiction, 44 UCLA L. REV. 2061, 207375 (1997) (finding that a court cannot decide to grant relief without first
examining, to some extent, the facts and underlying issues of the dispute). Channel
Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1993] A.C. 334, 367-368
(“There is always a tension when the court is asked to order, by way of interim
relief in support of arbitration, a remedy of the same kind as will ultimately be
sought from the arbitrators . . . .”). This perspective exemplifies national courts’
hesitation to grant interim relief when doing so may prejudice the ability of arbitral
proceedings to effectively resolve the dispute. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
7, at 349.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., China Arbitration Law, supra note 41, arts. 28, 46; Czech
Republic Law on Arbitral Proceedings and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 1994,
Section 22; Québec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. 1, art. 940.4 (Can.)
(noting that parties cannot obtain interim relief from arbitral tribunals and must
therefore resort to national courts).
105. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2009, supra note 18, at
1950 n.38 (“[I]f a tribunal is competent to decide an issue finally, with binding
effect, why should it not be competent to decide the same issue provisionally?”).
106. See Wauk, supra note 102, at 2075-78 (finding concurrent jurisdiction on
matters of interim relief to be an infringement on party autonomy and arbitrators’
powers).
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jurisdiction.107 Instead, concurrent jurisdiction often remedies the
shortcomings of arbitration and ensures the effectiveness of the
arbitration proceedings.108 Major criticisms of orders for interim
relief by arbitral tribunals include the unavailability of relief prior to
the formation of the arbitral tribunal,109 the tribunal’s inability to bind
third parties,110 and the tribunal’s lack of imperium to enforce its
awards.111 Concurrent jurisdiction addresses these concerns by
providing a forum in the courts to request measures prior to the
formation of the tribunal, the ability of court orders to bind third
parties if necessary, and the ability to enforce both their own and
arbitral tribunal orders.112
Recognizing the important functions of both the arbitrators and the
courts in procedures for interim relief, UNCITRAL amended Article
17 to provide a procedural framework incorporating concurrent
jurisdiction.113 To remedy the confusion surrounding the
107. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 68 (explaining that under the concurrent
jurisdiction approach, the substance of a dispute remains with the arbitrators).
108. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, at 711 (identifying as a rationale
behind concurrent jurisdiction the notion that parties should not be deprived of the
expediency of courts in the provision of interim relief solely because of the
existence of an arbitration agreement).
109. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 23, art. 23(2) (directing parties to apply to
judicial authorities for interim relief in the event the file has not yet been
transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal); see also Ferguson, supra note 4, at 58
(highlighting the lack of procedures available to parties for acquiring interim relief
prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal).
110. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶¶ 64, 70
(emphasizing that the tribunal can only act in regard to the parties to the dispute);
Intertec Contracting A/S v. Turner Steiner Int’l, SA, No. 98 Civ. 9116 (CSH),
2000 WL 709004 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that actions taken regarding the
arbitration agreement are “restricted to the immediate parties [to the contract]”).
111. See Christian Hausmaninger, The ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee
Procedure: A Step Towards Solving the Problem of Provisional Relief in
International Commercial Arbitration?, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 82, 87
(1992)(stating that arbitrators lack the coercive powers to enforce their orders);
Interim Award in Case 5835, 8 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 67, 69 (May 1997)
(admitting that arbitrators’ interim orders are less protective due to the lack of
enforcement power). But see Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶ 75 (noting
that, although arbitral tribunals lack coercive powers, coercion is usually
unnecessary for party cooperation).
112. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, at 711 (finding the parties’
requests to the courts for interim relief more effective in cases requiring urgency or
readily enforceable orders).
113. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶¶ 28-30, (discussing the
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appropriateness and power of arbitrators to issue interim relief,
Article 17 explicitly empowers arbitral tribunals to order interim
measures unless otherwise agreed by the parties.114 It also provides
arbitrators with guidance on the types of interim measures they can
issue, thereby reinforcing that they have the discretion to do so.115
Furthermore, Article 17 delineates the courts’ role in enforcing
orders for interim measures made by the arbitral tribunal.116
Adoption of Article 17 would resolve the confusion about the
respective powers of arbitral tribunals and the courts in granting
interim relief.117 This would result in a more efficient procedural
framework leaving arbitral tribunals to focus on the substantive and
procedural issues necessary to effectively resolve a dispute,118 while
the courts would be precluded from making factual determinations
and focus solely on enforcing the tribunal’s decisions.119

empowerment of arbitrators to order interim relief and adding that Article 17 was
drafted to ensure that a competent court may also issue interim relief).
114. See id. art. 17(1). Additionally, arbitration agreements can express the
parties’ views on recourse to national courts for interim relief. See, e.g., Remy
Amerique, Inc. v. Touzet Distribution, S.A.R.L., 816 F. Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (containing an arbitration agreement that explicitly provided that the parties
could seek interim relief from any appropriate court).
115. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(a)-(d) (providing that the
“interim measures” an arbitral tribunal can issue are those orders that maintain or
restore the status quo, prevent harm to the parties or prejudice to the arbitration
proceedings, preserve assets to satisfy a final award, and preserve evidence).
116. See id. art. 17H-17I (outlining the courts’ responsibility to recognize
interim measures issued by an arbitral tribunal and detailing the grounds for
refusing recognition or enforcement).
117. See id. art. 17 (providing that both arbitrators and the courts maintain
concurrent powers to issue enforceable interim measures of protection); see also,
id. art. 9 (stating that a request to the courts is not incompatible with an arbitration
agreement).
118. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 82 (observing
that guidelines providing clarifications of arbitrators’ power to order interim
measures would also foster states’ acceptance of both those guidelines and uniform
legislation enforcement).
119. See id. ¶ 71 (underscoring the point that courts should limit their discretion
to the procedural aspects of enforcing interim measures and should not involve
themselves in the substance of the measure or the tribunal’s conclusions).
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C. ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 17 WILL FOSTER HARMONIZATION
OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN NATIONAL ARBITRATION
LAWS
There is currently no uniform practice in granting interim relief in
arbitration.120 National laws differ significantly on the scope of the
arbitrators’ powers and in some cases use language so vague that any
power lying with the arbitrators is implied.121 This lack of clarity and
uniformity raises concerns about predictability and enforcement.122
These concerns, if left unaddressed, could have serious implications
for the future of arbitration, given that the success of arbitration is
dependent on the satisfaction of parties and their confidence in the
mechanism.123
When a party requests interim relief, the tribunal must determine
whether they have the authority to grant the request based on the
applicable standards and procedures.124 National arbitration laws,
specifically those modeled on the 1985 version of Article 17, lack
clarity regarding the scope of the arbitrators’ authority.125
Consequentially, arbitrators must reconcile governing national
laws,126 institutional arbitration rules if incorporated into the
120. See Wang, supra note 2, at 1075.
121. See LEW AT AL., supra note 2, at 593 (indicating that when neither the
governing law nor the applicable rules provide for or exclude the power of
arbitrators to order interim relief, such power has been inferred by a number of
tribunals); Yesilirmak, supra note 18, at 32 (noting that certain arbitral tribunals
have inferred their power to order interim rule from existing rules).
122. See Naimark & Keer, supra note 3, at 11; Jernej Sekolec, The Need for
Modern and Harmonized Regime for International Arbitration, 1 CROATIAN ARB.
Y.B. 27, 28 (1994) (recognizing the necessity of standardized rules for clarity and
legal certainty in arbitration).
123. See Guiseppe De Palo & Linda Costabile, Promotion of International
Commercial Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in Ten
Southern Mediterranean Countries, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 303, 304
(2006) (asserting that countries benefit from the confidence of investors in
arbitration).
124. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, at 921
(establishing that a determination of arbitrators’ authority to order provisional
relief is a threshold question for the party requesting relief); YESILIRMAK, supra
note 17, at 59, 160 (recognizing that national procedural rules can constrain the
authority of arbiters).
125. See 1985 Model Law, supra note 54, art. 17 (allowing for any measures
which the arbitrators consider necessary); Lowry, supra note 28, at 340
(recognizing the lack of a clear dividing line between arbitrators and the courts).
126. See Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶ 92 (recognizing that
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arbitration agreement,127 and the will of the parties to determine the
extent of their authority.128 While some argue that such provisions
should remain somewhat vague to give broad discretion to
arbitrators,129 others argue that arbitration legislation must balance
flexibility with sufficient guidance to ease arbitrators’ confusion and
hesitation.130 Arbitrators have attempted to glean coherent guidance
from the disarray of arbitration laws and rules,131 but there is no
clearly established framework on which arbitrators can rely.132
Moreover, some states are perceived as unfriendly seats for
arbitration133 because of the disparity within their arbitration law on
interim measures and enforcement problems.134 The significance of
arbitrators must account for the laws of the seat of the arbitration in determining
their power to order interim relief).
127. See LEW ET AL., supra note 2, at 167 (referring to the parties’ choice of ad
hoc or institutional arbitration and the subsequent governing procedural rules when
drafting an arbitration agreement).
128. See Interim Award in Case 7962 of 1995, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL.
62, 62 (Spring 2000) (upholding an agreement to arbitrate, which granted the
power to issue interim measures by the arbitral tribunal); Case 8113, supra note
26, at 65 (illustrating how the arbitration agreement can limit powers of the
tribunal).
129. See, e.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION
338 (1993) (arguing that strict guidelines may curb arbitrators’ ability to tailor their
orders for relief on a case-by-case basis).
130. See Sekolec, supra note 122, at 35 (pointing to the need of harmonized
guidance for arbitrators if the needs of international arbitration are to be met).
131. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 160-64 (outlining the different sources
an arbitrator must consider when determining the scope of their power); Rolf A.
Shütze, The Precedential Effect of Arbitration Decisions, 11 J. INT’L ARB. 69, 69,
72 (1994) (noting that while there is no true precedent in arbitration, in practice,
published case extracts provide guidance to arbitrators).
132. See Lew, supra note 18, at 26 (observing that unlike national court
procedures that clearly establish conditions under which interim measures can be
issued, the comparatively small number of arbitration cases do not provide a
comparable standard).
133. See, e.g., Phillip Capper, Section 69 and the “Interventionism” of English
Courts, KLUWER ARB. BLOG, Sept. 23, 2009, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2009/09/23/section-69-and-the-“interventionism”-of-english-courts/
(discussing the “lingering perception” of English courts as interventionist and
therefore unfriendly to arbitration proceedings).
134. The traditional approach was that only “final” awards were enforceable as
an arbitral award and that interim orders given their temporary nature did not
qualify as “final.” See Publicis Commc’n v. True North Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d
725, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that an arbitral order must be in the form of a
final award for judicial enforcement); Hart Surgical, Inc, v. Ultracision, Inc., 244
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this is two-fold: first, the state may garner a negative reputation
within the international arbitration community and second, this can
lead to unnecessary forum shopping, as the parties determine the seat
of the arbitration.135
UNCITRAL believes that uniform provisions detailing the
procedures for the enforcement of interim relief would be a
significant step to addressing these concerns.136 By adopting the
amendments to Article 17, states will establish the uniform
framework that arbitration proceedings lack.137 States will harmonize
their national laws, and in doing so, will foster stability and
predictability in arbitration proceedings.138 This will ease
enforcement of interim orders because states will have uniform
standards for the scope of power of arbitral tribunals. This will
eliminate the confusion from differing arbitration laws and will
ensure that all states are equally appealing as potential arbitral
seats.139
Furthermore, adoption of the amendments to Article 17 will lead
to greater confidence in international commercial arbitration. When
parties are aware that a procedure exists that protects their rights in a

F.3d 231, 233 (1st Cir. 2001); Mobil Oil Indon., Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indon.) Ltd.,
372 N.E.2d 21, 23 (N.Y. 1977) (commenting that a final award requires the
complete determination of submitted claims by the arbitrators); Michaels v.
Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a preliminary
order unenforceable because it was not a final resolution of the issues).
135. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 9 (commenting that because of
the disparity in national laws, “[a] party may well for those reasons hesitate or
refuse to agree to a place which otherwise, for practical reasons, would be
appropriate in the case at hand”).
136. See id. pt. 2, ¶ 2 (emphasizing that the model law would harmonize
national laws and that it reflects a “worldwide consensus”).
137. See Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶¶ 86, 93 (raising the variety of
approaches employed by states regarding interim relief and how an inclusion of
relevant provisions in the Model Law would lead to harmonization and greater
overall efficiency).
138. See Gu Weixia, Comment, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in
International Commercial Arbitration?, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 636 (2004)
(noting that fostering stability and predictability are “paramount requirements”
considered by parties in choosing arbitration).
139. See Benjamin G. Davis, The Color Line in International Commercial
Arbitration: An American Perspective, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 461, 478 (2003)
(asserting that jurisdictions unfriendly to arbitration hamper and constrain party
autonomy).
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manner that respects their choice of forum, they will feel more
comfortable with their decision and have greater confidence when
entering into arbitration agreements.140 This confidence stems from
parties’ notions that arbitration procedures will meet their
expectations and minimize unexpected hurdles and setbacks.141 By
recognizing the need for harmonization and codifying the provisions
set forth in Article 17, states can inspire this requisite confidence and
ensure the continuing reliability and stability of the field of
international commercial arbitration.142

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. STATES SHOULD INCORPORATE AMENDED ARTICLE 17
INTO NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS
As the processes and standards for the conduction of arbitration
have evolved and developed over time, so too have national
arbitration laws. States’ responses to the development of arbitration
laws should account for advancements in model legislation regarding
interim relief.143 To date, Mauritius, Slovenia, New Zealand, and
Peru incorporated the Model Law amendments into their national
law.144 By following suit and codifying the amendments to Article
17, other states will facilitate the resolution of international
140. Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Party Autonomy and Interim Measures in
International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 179, 180 (Albert Jan van
den Berg ed., 2003) (arguing that party choices should be taken into consideration
when allocating the power to order interim relief due to the contractual nature of
arbitration).
141. See AXEL BÖSCH, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION - A PRACTITIONER HANDBOOK 5 (1994) (opining that
“the unrestricted availability of provisional relief from public courts despite the
existence of an arbitration agreement could threaten to destroy completely the
advantages of arbitration”).
142. See Stephen W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation
Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 73, 105 (2007) (heralding stability and predictability as hallmarks of fair
legal systems).
143. See JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 905 (2d ed. 2007) (insisting that harmonization
between the courts and arbitrators alone is insufficient for effective arbitration and
advocating for a harmonization among states in arbitration matters).
144. See Status of Model Law, supra note 11, ¶ 5.
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commercial disputes by harmonizing arbitration legislation,
increasing enforceability of interim measures,145 increasing
confidence in international commercial arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism, and making all states equally attractive as
seats for arbitral disputes.146
Unfortunately, despite widespread support for the amendment
within UNCITRAL, the majority of states have yet to seriously
consider the incorporation of the amendment into national law.147 It
may be that it is simply too soon to expect widespread acceptance.
Additionally, states may have public policy reasons for not codifying
the amendments to Article 17. For example, states may not want to
empower arbitrators to provide interim relief or may generally place
stricter limitations on arbitrators’ powers.148 States may also disagree
with certain provisions of the Model Law amendment, such as the
debated inclusion of a provision on ex parte measures.149 However,
UNCITRAL anticipated these concerns by choosing to advance these
improvements in the form of model legislation.150 While UNCITRAL
hopes that states’ deviations from the Model Law text will be
minimal, it recognizes that states may wish to make changes for
various reasons.151
145. See Kieran Robert Hickie, The Enforceability of Interim Measures of
Protection Granted by Arbitral Tribunals Outside the Seat of Arbitration: A New
Approach, 12 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 221, 247-48 (2008)
(arguing that a standard uniform framework is an important step in increasing the
enforceability of foreign measures of interim relief).
146. See generally Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶ 11 (noting that a
country’s failure to adopt the Model Law may prohibit perspective users of
arbitration from accessing effective court assistance in that country).
147. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 81.
148. See, e.g., Mathew Coleman, Arbitration in Africa, AFR. LEGAL INT’L
LEGAL SERV. (2006), http://www.africalegal.co.za/ news/news_06112006.html
(noting that South Africa’s hesitation to adopt the Model Law is rooted in its
concerns over the scope of the court’s power in relation to the arbitration
proceedings).
149. See UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work
of its Thirty-Seventh Session, ¶¶ 16-18, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/523 (Nov. 11, 2002) (noting the divergent views concerning the
inclusion of ex parte provisions).
150. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 3 (finding model legislation to
be the best vehicle for harmonization and modernization of national arbitration
laws because of the flexibility it provides states when incorporating it into national
arbitration laws).
151. See id. (acknowledging the flexibility of model legislation, but encouraging
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States that do not wish to incorporate the amendments fully should
consider incorporating at least those provisions that are
uncontroversial as a first step in achieving greater harmonization.152
Additionally, if states are uncomfortable with adopting certain
provisions of the Model Law, they should discuss alternative
methods for achieving the goals of creating uniformity to protect
parties’ rights and facilitate arbitration proceedings.153 Last, if states
continue to refrain from adopting the new Article 17 provisions, they
should express the reasons for their hesitation and maintain an open
dialogue about the future. By providing justifications for their
reluctance, states can identify lingering concerns.154

B. UNCITRAL SHOULD CONSIDER ADDING A PROVISION TO
THE MODEL LAW REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF INTERIM
RELIEF PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF AN ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL
One of the major criticisms of delegating the power to order
interim relief primarily to the arbitral tribunal is the difficulty of
acquiring interim measures before the tribunal’s formation.155 To
encourage adoption of the Model Law provisions on interim
measures, and to make them more comprehensive, UNCITRAL
should consider adding a provision on obtaining interim relief before
the arbitral tribunal is formed.156 This provision should provide for
states incorporating the Model Law to make as few changes as possible).
152. See, e.g., International Arbitration Act 2008, Act. No. 37, pt. IV (Dec. 13,
2008) (Mauritius) available at http://supremeco urt.intnet.mu/Entry/dyn/GuestGet
Doc.Asp?Doc_Idx=7110944&Mode=Html&Search=No (codifying the majority of
the 2006 version of Model Law Article 17, but choosing to refrain from including
provisions on ex parte preliminary orders).
153
See, e.g., Launch of a New International Arbitration Forum Via E-Mail, 12 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 279, 279 (2001) (announcing the creation of a discussion forum
for the purposes of exchanging information and hosting debates on arbitration
issues).
154. Cf. Tómas Kennedy-Grant, Promised Land or Fire Swamp? Interim
Measures – The New Zealand Revolution: A Commentary 24 (Nov. 30, 2007)
available at http://www.kennedygrant.com/docs/Fire%20Swamp .pdf (responding
to concerns regarding the risks of “trailblazing” in the field).
155. See Arbitration and the Courts, supra note 77, at 82-86 (enunciating the
difficulties encountered in securing interim relief by parties to an arbitration prior
to the formation of the arbitral tribunal).
156. See, e.g., International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Dispute
Resolution Procedures, art. 37 (June 1, 2010) (permitting the use of emergency
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the rapid appointment of a temporary authority to resolve only those
matters related to immediate interim relief.157
One could argue that such measures are unnecessary because of
the courts’ concurrent jurisdiction.158 However, having a provision
that allow parties to obtain interim relief without recourse to the
courts demonstrates respect for the parties’ choice of arbitration and
meets their expectation that arbitration will effectively resolve their
dispute.159 Including a provision on attaining relief prior to the
formation of the tribunal and without recourse to the courts would
help alleviate parties’ uncertainty about whether such relief is
available prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal, and would
assist in harmonizing existing arbitration rules leading to a more
effective overall system.

C. THE UNCITRAL MODEL ARBITRATION RULES SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO CREATE UNIFORMITY WITH THE MODEL LAW
In light of the amendments made to the Model Law, UNCITRAL
undertook work to amend the Model Rules on Arbitration,160 which
are primarily used for ad hoc arbitration proceedings.161 The Working
measures of protection by a specially appointed emergency arbitrator); ICC Rules,
supra note 23, art. 20(4) (allowing for the appointment of an independent
individual for the limited purpose of inspected disputed property to make a
statement regarding their condition); see also Schwartz, supra note 85, at 58
(tracking the incorporation of provisions on emergency relief prior to the
appointment of the arbitral tribunal into institutional rules).
157. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2009, supra note 18, at
1971 (explaining that under certain emergency procedures, a sole arbitrator can be
appointed to hear requests for provisional relief).
158. See supra Part II.B (explaining that requests to courts for interim relief are
not incompatible with the arbitration agreement).
159. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 2 (reiterating the challenge of meeting
the expectations of a business person with regard to the interim protection of rights
in arbitration).
160. UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 1, delivered to the
general assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.145/Add.1 (Dec. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules Revision I] (designating the revision of the
UNCITRAL Rules as a priority for the Working Group and instructing the
Working Group to identify areas of improvement).
161. See Judith Levine, UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration Proposes
Revisions to Arbitration Rules, 19(4) WHITE & CASE INT’L DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (Dec.
2006) (identifying the UNCITRAL Model Rules as the most widely used
procedural rules in ad hoc arbitrations). It should also be noted that many regional
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Group on Arbitration and Conciliation is currently drafting revisions
to the Model Rules, among them provisions on interim measures of
protection in Article 26.162 The draft text proposed by the Working
Group is modeled closely on Article 17 of the Model Law,163 based
on the general consensus that the revision will further clarify the
conditions, circumstances, and procedures for granting interim
relief.164 The only area of contention is whether to include the
provision on ex parte measures into the Article 26 of the Model
Rules.165 To foster consistency and further harmonization,
UNCITRAL should adopt the proposed revisions of the Working
Group on Article 26 of the Model Rules.

CONCLUSION
As the field of international commercial arbitration develops to
meet the needs of globalizing trade and commerce, the availability of
interim measures in the arbitral context has become a primary
concern. UNCITRAL attempted to remedy these concerns by
providing model legislation on interim measures for states to
incorporate into their national laws. For the reasons set forth above,
there should be widespread adoption of the amended Article 17. The
Model Law’s purpose is to promote a uniformity of procedure among
states with diverse legislation, which will ultimately increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of the international commercial
arbitration system as a whole. The advantages that draw parties to

arbitration centers have also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Rules. See id.
162. See UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration), Settlement of
Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ¶ 26,
delivered to the General Assembly, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.149 (Nov. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules Revision II] (redlining Article 26, removing the old
article completely and substituting a much more in depth approach to interim
measures).
163. See id. (providing the draft text of the proposed revisions to Article 26 with
minor deviations in language and substance, but not including a provision on ex
parte measures).
164. See UNCITRAL Rules Revision I, supra note 160, ¶ 25 (attempting to create
consistency with the amended provisions to Article 17 in the model law and ensure
that party autonomy is given proper effect).
165. See UNCITRAL Rules Revision II, supra note 162, ¶¶ 28-29 (avoiding
language on “preliminary orders,” but agreeing to consider adding a provision to
allow the tribunal to take appropriate measure to avoid frustration of the final
award).
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arbitration amount to nothing unless the tribunal is able to protect the
parties’ rights during the arbitral process. States and arbitral
institutions should incorporate the improvements made by
UNCITRAL into their laws and rules to secure the rights of parties
both to choose their means for dispute resolution and to receive fair
and effective process.

